

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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1 MARCH 1963
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 1 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER

(United States of America)

63-07918

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. A. de MELO FRANCO
Mr. R. L. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. Frank da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. N. TARABANOV
Mr. G. GJELJEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. A. E. GOTTLIEB
Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. V. PECHOTA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato M. HAMID
Ato M. GHEBEXEHU

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL
Mr. A. S. MEHTA
Mr. S. B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M. T. MBU

Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. W. WLECZOREK

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Baron C. H. von PLATEN

Mr. S. LOFGREN

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I. G. USACHEV

Mr. P. F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S. E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. B. GODBER
Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J. G. TAHOUDIN
Mr. D. N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER
Mr. C. C. STELLER
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. R. A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUFI

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the one hundred and fourth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Today I should like to make a few remarks on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. In doing so I do not intend to sum up generally the whole of the negotiations that have taken place so far on this subject.

During the discussions in the Committee there have been established all the elements which, on the one hand, testify to the progress achieved in the negotiations, but on the other hand emphasize the seriousness of the obstacles which still stand in the way of speedy agreement.

Since the resumption of our Committee's work, that is since 12 February 1963, much time has elapsed. In our opinion, much greater progress could have been made had we availed ourselves of all existing opportunities. We regret to say that advantage has not been taken of the favourable situation for achieving an agreement which was brought about at the end of last year, and which was emphasized by the Soviet Government's considerable concessions on control over underground explosions. The incorrect appraisal which the Western Powers have given to this step of the Soviet Government creates the danger that these favourable conditions will be lost and cease to exist. Soberly assessing some of the events in the present international situation which cannot fail to have an influence on our negotiations, we are fully aware of the reality of this danger.

The representative of Poland, Mr. Naszkowski, rightly pointed out on 25 February that our disarmament negotiations are not something that "should take place in the abstract without regard to international events". (ENDC/PV.102, p. 13) After all, the subjects of our negotiations are very vital and, I would say, very acute international problems. Therefore, if we wish to retain a realistic view of matters, we cannot underestimate or simply disregard the general international situation.

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We cannot remain indifferent, for instance, to the fact that while we here in the Committee, by comparing views and arguments, are trying to create an acceptable basis for achieving an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, in the West a different activity is going on, which is aimed at further intensifying the nuclear arms race and disseminating nuclear weapons. Can such steps help towards the improvement of the international atmosphere and the strengthening of confidence between States, which are so necessary for our work? Quite the contrary. They arouse mistrust and increase suspicion. The plans and steps aimed at creating a so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force have already been commented on here.

It must be noted that in the negotiations for extending control over nuclear weapons to other NATO member States -- I am referring to the negotiations which are now going on within the framework of this group -- the United States is adopting a more flexible position than in our negotiations on disarmament. Thereby it is creating further serious obstacles to an improvement of the international atmosphere. Reports of feverish diplomatic activity between Western Powers, in particular between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, fully confirm the validity of the criticism expressed in the course of our negotiations by the delegations of the socialist States. Under the guise of creating multilateral forces, destructive nuclear weapons are to be delivered into the hands of the West German revanchists.

In this connexion two circumstances are characteristic. First, according to information appearing in the Western press -- for instance, in The New York Times of 23 February 1963 -- the United States Government is discussing the expedience of amending the Atomic Energy Act, 1954, so as to enable selected allies of the United States to participate in the American nuclear monopoly. Secondly, the Federal Republic of Germany is striving insistently, during the negotiations now going on in Washington with the West German Defence Minister von Hassel, to obtain for the Bundeswehr strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons with nuclear warheads and to be given the right to take part in the decision on the use of the nuclear weapons which, it is said, will be in the hands of NATO.

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The attitude of the United States Government, which appears to be meeting the military and political views of Bonn, arouses well-founded apprehensions among all peace-loving peoples throughout the world. The avidity with which the West German Bundeswehr is trying to get its hands on atomic weapons is a bad illustration of the assertions of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom that West Germany is a peace-loving State. If that were really so, the Federal Republic of Germany, instead of trying to obtain nuclear weapons, would try to find a way to negotiate on all outstanding political issues and to normalize its relations with its Eastern neighbours.

Thus a strange situation is coming about: while we are here conducting negotiations on disarmament and seeking for ways to reduce international tension, the Governments of the Western Powers are proceeding to carry out measures in flagrant contradiction with the aims of our negotiations, since they lead to a further intensification of the nuclear armaments race. This is proved by the fact that, notwithstanding the appeal contained in resolution 1762 (XVII) of the General Assembly (ENDC/63), adopted by the overwhelming majority of the Member States, the United States Government has resumed underground nuclear weapon tests. There can be no doubt about the serious consequences which this step may have for our negotiations.

On this subject, permit me, Mr. Chairman, to revert once more to the statement made by the head of your delegation, Mr. Stevenson, at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly. As I have already mentioned in my first intervention, Mr. Stevenson said among other things that the United States was completing a series of tests begun in the spring of last year, and that a "rare period of equilibrium may have been reached in this sector of the arms race" (A/C.1/PV.1246, p. 47). Basing himself on this premise, Mr. Stevenson addressed the following appeal to the representatives of the States Members of the United Nations.

(continued in English)

"In conclusion, let me suggest that we are at one of the fateful turning points of history, when the civilization of our times faces a choice between hope and horror. If we choose wrong, or if we fail to choose at all, the consequences to a world already sorely wounded by two world wars in a generation are frightening at best." (ibid.)

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

(continued in Russian)

We are convinced that the decision of the United States Government to conduct new underground tests in Nevada renders much more difficult that very choice about which Mr. Stevenson spoke at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly. The representative of India, Mr. Lall, in his statement on 20 February, when making an appeal that there should be no new tests, said very rightly that: "We all know that if once tests start they lead to other tests" (ENDC/PV.100, p. 19).

In an endeavour to justify the new underground tests carried out by the United States, Mr. Stelle said in his statement on 22 February that this was the continuation of a series begun in the autumn of 1961 (ENDC/PV.101, p. 42). We also heard that argument from you, Mr. Chairman; and, I will say frankly, it did not convince us. The question whether the present tests now being carried out by the United States are a component part of any particular series cannot in any way alter the basic fact that these tests are having a most unfavourable effect, not only on the negotiations in our Committee, but also on the international situation in general, and that they are giving a new impetus to the nuclear armaments race.

I mention all these events, not at all for the purpose of diverting the Committee's attention from the specific problems on our agenda, but because they are closely connected with the continuing nuclear armaments race and all its dangerous consequences. When determining our position we are bound to take them into account.

During the last three weeks we have heard numerous assurances by the representatives of the Western Powers that they sincerely desire to achieve an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests, as well as on the wider issue of general and complete disarmament. We would be happy if those assurances were accompanied by positive actions, both here in the Committee and outside it, to improve the general international situation.

The Czechoslovak Government and all our people expected -- and in my opinion they had every right to expect -- that the important proposals for the control of underground tests, relating to the use of automatic seismic stations and, in particular, to on-site inspection, which the Government of the Soviet Union submitted at the end of last year (ENDC/73) would lead to rapid agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests for all time. It seemed that the key to the solution of the controversial question of control measures had thereby been found.

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The principle was admitted that reliable control over compliance with an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests could be guaranteed by the existing networks of national stations. As accumulated experience shows, all explosions that have been carried out so far, including underground explosions, have been recorded by the existing national stations of various countries. A network of national stations which can be used for detection exists in many States. As the statements of many authoritative specialists prove, those means are fully adequate for the purpose of detecting explosions not only in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water, but also underground, and for identifying their nature, place, and approximate magnitude.

The efficiency of a control mechanism based on national means would be guaranteed by the fact that an international scientific commission would have at its disposal, in addition to data from the national stations of other States, information from the national stations of the State on whose territory an unidentified event had occurred. Thus it would be possible to determine reliably the nature of the so-called unidentified events to the existence of which the representative of the United States refers in order to justify his demand for on-site inspection.

On 22 February the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, stated:

"Most recently we have agreed to place our reliance on national systems checked by various kinds of instrumentation, and without international supervision." (ENDC/PV.101, p. 42)

He also said that at present there is no longer any issue on a system based essentially on nationally-manned detection systems.

For this reason we share the view expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union on 27 February that on the question of the use of national identification systems as the basic control system the positions of both sides agree in principle (ENDC/PV.103, pp. 23, 24). We ought at the present stage of our negotiations to put this agreement on record and thereby help forward the achievement of agreement on another important issue the functions and number of automatic seismic stations.

Although it continues to consider control by means of existing national systems fully adequate and reliable, the Soviet Government, guided by the desire to create

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an acceptable basis for agreement, and taking into consideration the position of the Western Powers, has suggested that the functioning and reliability of this control system should be verified by a small number of automatic seismic stations on the territories of the nuclear Powers which, if necessary, would be serviced with the participation of international personnel. The Soviet Government has also agreed to the carrying-out of two or three on-site inspections a year.

The Soviet Union proposes the installation of automatic stations and the dispatch of on-site inspection teams solely in order to meet the political demand of the Western Powers. The direct effect of such measures may be reflected in particular in the political field, mainly in getting rid of the mistrust which still exists in international relations. In the light of this, the steps taken by the Soviet Government represent far-reaching concessions to the positions of the Western Powers; and one might have expected that they would have done away with the main objections to the conclusion of an agreement which have been put forward by the Western Powers throughout the previous negotiations.

Unfortunately, just as has happened many times in the past, this sincere desire of the Soviet Union to achieve a mutually-acceptable agreement has failed to meet with similar action by the Western Powers. On the contrary, after the Soviet Union had gone forward to meet the Western Powers on what they considered to be a key issue, their representatives put forward new demands. As we all know, they demanded that the Soviet Union should agree to eight to ten inspections a year. Now they are proposing seven inspections. They say that this number is necessary for effective and reliable control.

The arguments with which they try to bolster these demands are, I must say, rather peculiar. They say that if the Soviet Union could make one concession and agree to two or three inspections a year -- although this step was determined solely by political considerations, namely the desire to open the way to agreement --, then there should be nothing to prevent the Soviet Union from making another concession to increase the number of on-site inspections in accordance with the new demands of the Western Powers. Characteristic in this regard was the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom on 27 February (ENDC/PV.103, pp.25 et seq.)

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It seems to us, however, that the representatives of the Western Powers realize the inconsistency of their position. Only two or three months ago they kept assuring us that if the Soviet Union would agree to two to four inspections a year, the way to an agreement would be open. That is why they are now trying somehow to deny those statements, as if last autumn they had neither proposed nor demanded anything of the sort.

I think that in order to understand the situation that has now come about in the negotiations it is necessary to make clear the position concerning on-site inspections that was actually taken by the Western Powers in the autumn of last year. In our view, this is not a question of formal deficiencies in the presentation of demands, for example, by the United States, or of some misunderstanding; it is a question of principle. Certain representatives have already quoted a statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom in which he appealed to the Government of the Soviet Union to **return** to the position on on-site inspection which it took before the autumn of 1961. It is well known that at that time the Government of the Soviet Union was proposing three on-site inspections a year as fully adequate. It is also known that the United States representatives, in earlier negotiations with the Soviet representatives, spoke about the possibility of accepting two to four on-site inspections a year.

But let us take a look at the documents of that period -- that is last autumn. Concerning the position of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber on 26 October 1962, speaking at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, stated:
(continued in English)

"... an agreement is still possible, now and at once, on the basis of those few on-site checks a year which were, as I have indicated, within the limits of the policy which Mr. Khrushchev himself declared and which was still sustained up until November of last year ..." (A/C.1/PV.1256, p. 41)

(continued in Russian)

I think that statement is clear enough. Mr. Godber spoke literally of "those few on-site checks a year" which were "within the limits of the policy which Mr. Khrushchev himself declared".

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One might object that this was the position of the United Kingdom, but that perhaps the Government of the United States might take a different position on this question. Therefore it will be appropriate to cite the point of view held at that time by the representative of the United States. On 10 October 1962 Mr. Stevenson, speaking at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, stated:
(continued in English)

"... only one obstacle bars the path to the first great step toward nuclear sanity. The Soviet Union has not yet agreed to reaffirm the position which it took from 1958 until November 1961 -- that on-site inspection was a necessary element of any test ban agreement."

(A/C.1/PV.1246, p. 38-40)

(continued in Russian)

A few lines later we read the following explanation by Mr. Stevenson:

(continued in English)

"If the Soviet Union really wants an agreement to stop all testing for ever, we frankly cannot understand why some inspection at the site, which was acceptable to the Soviet Union a year ago, should not be acceptable today." (ibid.)

(continued in Russian)

In our opinion, that again is an unambiguous statement referring to the few on-site inspections which had been acceptable to the Soviet Union one year earlier.

I think that those two quotations do not leave much room for "misunderstanding" about the demands put forward last autumn by the Western Powers for the number of on-site inspections which, in their opinion, the Soviet Union should accept. The Government of the Soviet Union, and all those who followed the course of our negotiations on the cessation of nuclear testing last year, were fully entitled to assume that, when the Western Powers appealed to the Soviet Union to return to the position it had taken from 1958 up to November 1961 concerning the number of on-site inspections, they were referring precisely to that position of the Soviet Union according to which, as is well known, it proposed three on-site inspections a year.

What could be the cause of that sudden change in the position of the Western Powers? One is bound to ponder on the interdependence between their position on

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control and the military, strategic and political considerations by which they are guided in their policy towards the socialist States. On this subject it might be of interest to look at some comments and views of Western authors on our negotiations for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. For instance, Donald Brennan and Morton Halperin, in their article "Policy Considerations of a Nuclear Test Ban", appearing in the symposium "Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security" (New York 1961, p. 226), express thus the interesting arguments of competent circles in the United States regarding on-site inspection:

(continued in English)

"It appears to us that the primary motivation for on-site inspection in the Soviet Union is to contribute to the 'openness' of Soviet society. For this purpose 20 inspections per year are obviously better than 3, but the difference does not strike us as justification for throwing away all the possible gains of a ban".

(continued in Russian)

There is no need to explain in detail what is concealed in the expression "to contribute to the 'openness' of Soviet society". New opportunities for intelligence activities and the weakening of the security of the Soviet State -- those are the aptest synonyms of this slogan, which has been widely popularized of late, particularly in the United States.

In our opinion, a prerequisite for further progress in our negotiations is to achieve agreement on the main outstanding questions. This applies first of all to the number of on-site inspections, and the number of automatic stations to be placed on the territory of each of the nuclear Powers. One would have thought that on this essentially procedural question there ought not to be any differences between us. However, certain representatives of the Western Powers are trying to create the impression that the solution of such a purely political question as the determination of the number of annual on-site inspections depends on certain technical and other factors and details. Under this pretext attempts are being made to impose on this Committee at the present stage long-drawn-out discussions on a number of technical questions having very little to do with an agreement in principle on an annual quota of on-site inspections.

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It appears, however, that in trying to justify their demands our Western colleagues put forward arguments which are often contradictory. On the one hand, as practically their only argument in favour of an unacceptably high number of on-site inspections a year, the representatives of the Western Powers assert that the number of inspections must be in some "reasonable" proportion to the number of unidentified seismic events. At the same time they say that the determination of the number of inspections must also depend on the composition of the inspection teams, in the sense of the national distribution of their members. It is an undoubted fact that the composition of the inspection teams is in no way related to the number of so-called unidentified events to be verified by means of on-site inspection. It is equally unrelated to the number of unidentified events and the other technical details the discussion of which the Western representatives are trying to make a matter of priority, such as the number of inspection teams, the extent of the area to be inspected, and the question of who is to decide in each particular case whether on-site inspection teams should be dispatched.

I am not putting forward all these facts in order to start a controversy on procedure; this is an important question which has a direct bearing on the results of our negotiations. Distorting the proportions between individual aspects of the question under discussion leads to substitution of secondary questions for the main ones. Therefore we consider that in the present circumstances the correct and acceptable approach is to require that those question connected with an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests which ought to be considered first should really be given priority. Any other approach can only give rise to further difficulties and delays.

Those were some of the remarks I wished to make on behalf of my delegation in connexion with our negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. It seems to me that all the circumstances which I have mentioned confirm once again the view of many delegations present here: that if we wish to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, there are no serious scientific or technical problems in ensuring reliable control. In our opinion the main obstacle to agreement is the Western Powers' lack of the necessary political readiness to consent straight away to an agreement on the cessation of tests on conditions acceptable to both sides.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

We are not conducting negotiations here for the sake of negotiation. We are pursuing a specific aim: the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests for ever. We agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that such an agreement would have considerable importance not only for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests but also for the solution of other problems related to general and complete disarmament.

The threat of a thermo-nuclear war, the reality of which has once again been confirmed by recent events, should prompt us to redouble our efforts; but in the first place it should contribute to a more sober appraisal of the present situation by those circles which are still basing their political calculations on the policy of a "balance of terror". This would do much to clear the path leading out of the present tense international situation. Therefore I should like in conclusion to express the hope that the Western Powers will reconsider their position and reply in a positive way to the important concessions which the Soviet Union has recently made.

The fragile structure of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests which gradually began to take shape before our eyes at the beginning of this year has now been subjected to the onslaught, I would say, of an icy blast blowing, not from the peaks of the Alps, but from a distance of thousands of kilometres from here, from the nuclear testing site in Nevada. The constructive approach of the Soviet Union has created, we are convinced, the necessary prerequisites for a successful completion of this structure. If the other side displays a similar readiness to achieve agreement, this structure will be saved from destruction. Otherwise we shall become the unwilling witnesses of a lost opportunity which may never present itself again.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I should like to speak now in my capacity as United States representative. Today is the last time I shall have an opportunity to speak to the Committee before I return home this week-end in connexion with my duties in the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I have asked for the floor today to give my views on where we stand.

The Soviet Union has told us that before we can make progress toward a nuclear test ban treaty we must agree to its recent revival of a former offer of two or

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three on-site inspections. The Soviet Union has declared that we must accept the Soviet view that the question of the number of on-site inspections should be settled before all other questions. In addition, the Soviet Union insists that the West must accept its offer of a maximum of three inspections. Further, the Soviet Union has said that on-site inspections are not really necessary. The Soviet offer of two or three inspections is described by the Soviet delegation and by the representative of Czechoslovakia as purely a political gesture to the West. In fact, the Soviet delegation alleges that the West proposed last autumn the number of on-site inspections which the Soviet Union is now offering. After outlining the Western position I shall return to each of those points.

What positions have the United Kingdom and the United States taken on the question of a test ban? We have indicated that we wish to discuss, concurrently with the question of the annual quota of on-site inspections, the questions of when, where, how and by whom inspections are to be carried out. We have not insisted on priority for any one of those questions. Rather we have made it clear that we are flexible about the discussion of those matters, so long as we know that a number of inspections, once agreed, can effectively be carried out. We have stated that, if the Soviet Union finds difficulties with our position on the modalities of on-site inspection, we will explore such questions with the objective of reaching agreement. We have made it clear that an adequate set of procedures and arrangements for on-site inspections should make it easier to find a mutually-acceptable number of inspections. Also we have clearly indicated that we have been attempting on our part to conduct real negotiations on this number of on-site inspections. In sum, we want to negotiate. Unfortunately, we have found that thus far the Soviet Union does not.

Let me now turn to some of the arguments which the Soviet Union has advanced to support its position. The first argument that I wish to deal with is the Soviet claim that national systems are sufficient to detect and identify all nuclear tests, including those under ground. The Soviet representatives state that on-site inspections are not necessary. They claim that national systems can detect and identify all seismic events. Therefore, the Soviet Union charges, the Western position requiring such inspections is based only on a desire to conduct espionage in the Soviet Union. However, that position is contradicted by the Soviet

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scientists themselves who signed the report (EXP/NUC/28) of the Geneva Conference of Experts in 1958, the report (GEN/DNI/63*) of Technical Working Group II in 1959, and the Pugwash statement (ENDC/66) last September, suggesting the use of automatic seismic stations. All those documents clearly recognize the scientific need for on-site inspections, and all are signed by distinguished Soviet scientists, including experts in the field of seismology.

We also have before us the article signed by three Soviet scientists, referred to by Mr. Kuznetsov a week ago, which appeared in Izvestia on 11 November 1962 (ENDC/67). That article was written for the purpose of refuting the Western position on the scientific need for on-site inspection. And yet, if one reads the article carefully, one finds that in fact it recognizes that it is not possible to identify by distant instrumentation all seismic events, and that further improvements in seismology are necessary in order to accomplish that.

Finally, if the Soviet Union is really able to identify all United States tests, we ask again that the Soviet representative present to this Conference the seismic records which his Government must have made of all the underground tests, both announced and unannounced, conducted by the United States. It is, of course, obvious that the Soviet Union is able to know whether seismic events on its own soil are earthquakes, but, quite frankly, we are not. The failure of the Soviet Union to produce records of events on United States soil, or to tell what its technology for identification is, casts serious doubt on its claims. Incidentally, within the last two months we invited a distinguished Soviet seismologist to visit our latest Vela seismic station. He did so. We are quite willing to demonstrate the state of our technology, but we have not had that same response from the Soviet Union. Consequently the present Soviet acceptance of three on-site inspections should be considered, not as some sort of gift to the Western Powers, but rather as a partial recognition of reality. We hope the Soviet Union will give greater credence to scientific reality in the course of these negotiations.

With regard to espionage, I should only like to quote what President Kennedy wrote to Chairman Khrushchev on 28 December 1962. The President said:

"To me, an effective nuclear test ban treaty is of such importance that I would not permit such international arrangements to become mixed up with our or any other national desire to seek other types of information about the Soviet Union." (ENDC/74, p.2)

(The Chairman, United States)

In the second place, the Soviet Union tells us to agree on its proposed number of on-site inspections and that then we can conclude a test-ban treaty. We have grave doubts about that. How can we tell that an annual quota of inspections would be adequate unless we know how meaningful each inspection would be? A general answer to that question will be necessary before any final agreement can be reached either on a treaty itself or on the quota of on-site inspections. In framing an answer we shall need to resolve the following problems.

First, what criteria are to be used to locate suspicious earth tremors; and similarly what criteria should be used to classify certain of them, at least, as earthquakes and not as explosions? As this Conference knows, we have proposed scientific formulae through the use of which seismic events can be located and certain earthquakes can be identified. The Soviet Union, until November 1961, had proposed formulae similar in part. Does the Soviet Union now return to its formulae, does it accept ours, or has it new proposals to make?

Secondly, how are suspicious earth tremors to be chosen for inspection within the quota? We were apparently once in agreement on using the process of "choice by the other side" of events to be inspected. Where does the Soviet Union stand now on that issue?

Thirdly, what is the size and shape of the area which should be inspected with respect to a doubtful seismic event? We have proposed what we consider appropriate arrangements. But thus far the Soviet Union has failed to take any position on the matter.

Fourthly, how would inspection be carried out? We have proposed that teams conduct a thorough examination of the inspection area by means of low-level aerial inspection and intensive examination of the ground and sub-surface to search for radioactive debris or any other evidence of a treaty violation. We had thought such procedures were agreed between us before the Soviet reversal of position of November 1961. We have again asked the Soviet Union whether it still accepts that agreement, but thus far have had no answer. We have also assured the Soviet Union that we are willing to incorporate safeguards for the transit of inspection teams to the site of the event to ensure an absolute minimum of interference with the host country and no possible chance of espionage. Those arrangements were referred to in Chairman Khrushchev's letter of 7 January 1963 (ENDC/73). In addition, we have offered to permit at all times host-country observers to be with the inspection

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team and at the inspection site. We have also agreed to exclude sensitive defence installations from the inspection area under an agreed set of conditions. Each of those proposals has been presented to the Soviet Union for its reaction and comment. The Soviet delegation stands mute.

Finally, what will be the composition of the teams to carry out the on-site inspections? We have made proposals on that question too, but thus far we have received no answer.

Our interest in securing responses from the Soviet Union on those general principles, which we have phrased in the form of questions, is to be able to determine how meaningful any particular inspection quota might really be. Judgement as to the minimum necessary quota must be based upon a clear idea of its effectiveness as a deterrent and for confidence building. Both sides must be certain that an inspection can be effectively carried out in order to determine the nature of the origin of a doubtful seismic event. We earnestly seek Soviet answers on those questions. The relationship between the quota number and the inspection arrangements has been clearly recognized by a number of delegations at this Conference.

Now I turn to another subject. The Soviet delegation has alleged, in presenting its position on on-site inspection, that Mr. Arthur H. Dean, at some point during informal discussions with Mr. Kuznetsov in New York last autumn, suggested as acceptable two to four on-site inspections annually. That is not the case. Here is the record. On 30 October Mr. Dean, accompanied by Mr. Akalovsky of the United States delegation, called on Mr. Kuznetsov in New York. The conversation centred primarily on current General Assembly matters, and the test-ban problem was discussed briefly and only in general terms. Mr. Kuznetsov reaffirmed the position held by the Soviet Union at that time, denying the need for on-site inspection and stating that such inspection was unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Mr. Dean stressed the United States' desire to engage in serious negotiations for a test ban. He further expressed the view that some mutually-satisfactory arrangement to cover cessation of testing in all environments, while providing assurances against clandestine tests underground, should be possible. In that connexion he said that the United States had in mind a small number of on-site inspections, but did not mention any specific figure. Thus the Soviet claim that Mr. Dean offered two to four inspections on 30 October is inaccurate.

(The Chairman, United States)

They met next on 7 November at Mr. Kuznetsov's initiative, at the Soviet Mission in New York. Again Mr. Dean was accompanied by Mr. Akalovsky. Reading from a prepared text and stating that he was acting on instructions, Mr. Kuznetsov reviewed the Soviet position on the test ban -- a position which still excluded any on-site inspection on Soviet territory.

Mr. Dean re-emphasized the United States position that on-site inspections were necessary and that their number was related to the number of unidentified seismic events. He also said that, because of the progress achieved under the Vela Research Programme, the United States might be prepared to accept something like eight to ten on-site inspections, and eight to ten nationally-manned control posts under international supervision. He observed that ninety per cent of the territory of the Soviet Union was aseismic, and suggested the possibility of subdividing Soviet territory into seismic and aseismic areas. He remarked that United States scientists believed that, if two control posts were located in the aseismic portion of the heartland of the Soviet Union and eight in the seismic areas, only very few inspections might be required in the aseismic areas.

Afterwards Mr. Timerbaev, a member of the Soviet mission who also had attended the meeting, approached Mr. Akalovsky to check Mr. Dean's remarks about the number of nationally-manned stations and of on-site inspections. Mr. Akalovsky referred Mr. Timerbaev to what Mr. Dean had said, with Mr. Timerbaev repeating the number of eight to ten on-site inspections and Mr. Akalovsky confirming the accuracy of his account.

Consequently, there are no grounds for doubt about the numbers mentioned by Mr. Dean; and that makes subsequent claims by Soviet representatives, that on 30 October Mr. Dean had in fact mentioned the two to four figure, quite surprising. Both United States participants in those meetings confirm the facts which I have just given to this Conference. Nevertheless, it is possible that there might have been some misunderstanding. If that is the case, we deeply regret it. But from the text of President Kennedy's letter to Chairman Khrushchev on 23 December 1962 (ENDC/74), there could have been no misunderstanding that eight to ten on-site inspections was the United States position.

I apologize for taking up so much time in the Conference with this historical record of United States-Soviet bilateral conversations, but I do hope there will be no further allegations that the United States proposed something which it never did propose.

(The Chairman, United States)

Turning now to the procedures of our Conference in discussing the nuclear weapon test ban question we continue to believe that, as has been stated by the delegations of Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, as well as by our allies, first priority should be placed on the negotiation of a nuclear test ban. Indeed, we have indicated that we should be willing to proceed along any of the three alternative routes set out by the representative of the United Arab Republic on 18 February (ENDC/PV.99, p.15). Also we should be willing to support and to participate in the parallel discussion on the number of on-site inspections and the modalities of inspection as proposed by the representative of Brazil in his statement on Wednesday (ENDC/PV.103, p.11), an approach which I believe is in accordance with the suggestions of the representative of India made on 20 February (ENDC/PV.100, p.14). The United States Government would also be willing to discuss technical questions -- as suggested by the representative of Brazil on 15 February (ENDC/PV.98, p.17) and by the representative of Sweden on 20 February (ENDC/PV.100, p.25).

The United States believes that, after all the representatives have had a chance to make their views on a nuclear test ban known in the plenary Committee, we should turn to a discussion of that subject in the nuclear test ban Sub-Committee. Nevertheless, if it proves impossible for the time being to reconvene the Sub-Committee that fact should not hinder our efforts to seek agreement. Under agreed procedures we should be quite willing to allocate a number of plenary meetings primarily for the discussion of the test ban. I urge that we continue to work at straightening out our procedures. With our procedural house in order we should then be able to get down to business on substantive issues.

In closing, I should like to say that it has been a great pleasure to work with all the representatives here, and that I very much hope that I shall be back with them again soon.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): During the three weeks' discussion which has taken place since the resumption of work by the Disarmament Conference, all the delegations have stressed particularly that the present moment is especially favourable for negotiating and concluding an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. It has also been emphasized that recently the

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positions of the two sides have come considerably closer together, and that in consequence efforts should be redoubled to reach an agreement on the prohibition of all tests.

It is well known that this rapprochement of the positions of the two parties is due to the important concessions the Government of the Soviet Union has made. In accepting the principle of on-site inspection on the territory of each of the nuclear Powers, and the figure of two or three inspections per annum, it has brought the positions on this question closer together. Appeals have been made from all sides not to let slip this favourable opportunity and to take advantage of the possibilities which exist for reaching an agreement. Certain delegations have very appropriately spoken of striking while the iron is hot, and have told us that we must therefore work for the conclusion of an agreement while the mood and the conditions are propitious.

The necessity and urgency of an agreement have been stressed in view of the possibility that the international situation may develop so as to face us with new circumstances and complications which will increase the obstacles to an agreement. The anxiety has been expressed that, if we let slip the present favourable moment for an agreement, the forces opposing an agreement might prevail and it might be necessary to wait a long time before conditions favourable to the settlement of the question of the cessation of nuclear tests could be created anew. The representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, was clearly referring to this possibility in his speech opening the present session when he drew attention to the sense of urgency with which we should all be imbued. He said

"How much time is left? Forces acting in national political life, sometimes in opposition, may well obscure the objectives essential for the attainment of collective security, general peace and the survival of mankind." (ENDC/PV.96, p.7)

It is not by mere chance that keen anxiety has been expressed in certain countries lest the views of certain circles which favour the use of force for settling international differences and the use of nuclear weapons in present circumstances may prevail, unless a stop can be put to the nuclear armaments race and unless these weapons can be eliminated from the arsenals of States. Quite recently the Federation of American Scientists, which has some 2,500 members,

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appealed to the United States Government to declare officially and emphatically that it would not launch a massive nuclear attack except in retaliation for a similar attack. Moreover, as you will remember, the President of the United States stated at his press conference on 22 February that a number of people in the United States are opposed to the efforts being made at Geneva. He added that if these efforts failed, there was a serious risk that the number of nuclear Powers in the world would increase during the coming years and that this would entail real dangers.

These were the considerations which led members of this Conference to insist that priority be given to discussion of the cessation of nuclear tests. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria expressed its view on this point quite clearly in its speech of 22 February (ENDC/PV.101, p.18) that it was in favour of the proposal to discuss this issue in plenary session immediately after Mr. Foster's return from the United States. Mr. Foster is again leaving us, but we shall certainly have to discuss this question in his absence. We continue to think that the cessation of tests deserves our full attention and that, until an agreement can be reached on the cardinal points, all our attention should be focussed on this question.

This of course does not mean that the other questions on the Conference's agenda should be neglected. On the contrary, they should be given the place which they deserve, especially as agreement on any of them might have an important effect on our work and on the general climate of our discussions.

Once it has been generally recognized that the present moment is the most favourable for concluding an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, the next step is naturally to choose the most effective procedure for solving this problem. This will be considerably easier to decide if the salient points of the problem are borne in mind.

As we know, the Soviet Union takes the view, as it has stated on a number of occasions, that to ensure strict observance of the terms of a nuclear test agreement it is sufficient to make use of the national systems of detection and identification of seismic events. However, in view of the insistence of the Western Powers on the introduction of some quite superfluous measures of on-site inspection, and in order to facilitate agreement, the Soviet Union first expressed willingness to accept the memorandum of the eight non-aligned Powers (ENDC/28) as a compromise proposal, and later, with the same end in view, accepted the principle of on-site inspection (ENDC/73).

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

After these important concessions by the Soviet Union, the main divergence of views now concerns only the number of on-site inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations. In other words, they only refer to a negligible part of the whole control system necessary for our agreement. It is therefore natural that discussion at this Conference should bear precisely on these questions. They are moreover essentially political questions, on which a decision should be considerably easier to reach.

In his speech of 27 February (ENDC/PV.103, pp.6 et seq.) the representative of Italy demonstrated this point in a striking manner. He produced proof, if any proof is necessary in support of the view that before agreement can be reached on the cessation of nuclear tests, a settlement must be found for the principal points, particularly on-site inspection and the number of automatic seismic stations. It would indeed be impossible to arrive at any other conclusion after carefully reading the questions set out in the list submitted by the Italian delegation.

It is obvious enough that the questions of technology and detail mentioned by Mr. Cavalletti could be solved without any particular difficulty once the principal points to which he referred had been settled. This appears indeed to be the view of the Italian delegation itself. In his speech of 27 February Mr. Cavalletti said:

"There are, as we are only too well aware, certain problems which constitute at present the main obstacles to our negotiations: the number of inspections, and the number of automatic stations". (ibid., p.5)

The representative of Italy suggested accordingly that we should study the questions set out in the Italian delegation's list "independently of the solution of the two main controversial issues". (ibid.,

This independent study of the questions of technology and detail set out in the list submitted by the Italian delegation should certainly be undertaken. This should, however, be done at a later stage in these negotiations, and should be entrusted to bodies competent and able to solve these problems. It is perfectly clear that this study should be made after the principal problems have been solved. My delegation sees no point in plunging the Conference into endless discussions on technical and scientific details when what we need is a political

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decision. To insist on the discussion of questions of technology or detail while artificially leaving the principal points on one side is in fact another way, indirect it is true but equally effective, of refusing negotiations on the problem appearing on our agenda.

It is true that the United States delegation seems to hold a very different view from the Italian delegation on which are the important points and which are the questions of technology and detail. In his speech of 12 February, speaking of the technical questions which should be settled so that an agreement on the tests could be signed, Mr. Foster said:

"It is a fact which has been obscured by a debate over numbers. It is a fact, none the less, which is far broader than the present much publicized inspection quota controversy". (ENDC/PV.96, p.10)

I repeat again, however, that he was speaking of questions of technology and detail.

In this divergence of views between the two Western delegations over what constitute the principal points which should be resolved in order to achieve agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, we are frankly on the side of the Italian delegation. We too consider that the two principal controversial problems are those concerning the number of inspections and the number of black boxes. Once we have agreed on these numbers, all difficulties will be smoothed out and we shall be able to agree on the other questions without difficulty.

These are the points on which my delegation would like to make some brief observations today. At a recent meeting the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, stated in reply to a speech by the representative of the Soviet Union that the Western Powers never suggested the figures to which the Soviet Union agreed in its latest concessions (ENDC/PV.100, p.45). The quotations made today by the representative of Czechoslovakia (*supra*, p. 11) show that in the speeches which were made both here and in the General Assembly it was in fact suggested that the United States might be satisfied with these figures. On the other hand, in your speech this morning, you yourself, Mr. Chairman, making a brief but detailed review of all the conversations, denied, on the basis of the United States delegation's data, having suggested such figures. I must, however, repeat that the quotations which we have given today show that the United States and the Western Powers did in fact suggest such figures in their statements. The efforts

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which are now being made by the Western Powers to deny that they ever suggested a small number of on-site inspections, and in particular the figures mentioned in the Soviet concessions of 19 December, will, we are sure, convince no one here.

It is not necessary for me to remind you that the view held generally, and especially by the non-aligned countries, is that obligatory on-site inspections are not necessary for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. The General Assembly itself decided (ENDC/63) to recommend the Joint Memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28) as a basis for negotiating the cessation of nuclear tests. This memorandum made no mention of obligatory on-site inspections.

We do not wish to dwell on this point, nor on the comments made at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly by the delegations of a large number of non-aligned countries. This was recently done in a brilliant manner by the representative of Poland (ENDC/PV.102, pp.14 et seq.). It is clear that the demands made on the Soviet Union by the Western delegations have been met. But the Western Powers have abandoned the positions which they suggested in the past. It is therefore difficult to understand the alleged flexibility of the positions of the Western Powers. Or are we to understand that this flexibility is so extreme that it allows them to abandon positions they themselves had suggested in the past? This might be regarded as excessive flexibility.

In any case, would it be too much to ask our Western colleagues to show a little more consistency in their own proposals, especially when these have been taken into consideration by the other side? Of course -- if only to save Mr. Godber from going back once more on his own statements -- we do not claim that these were official proposals of the Western Powers signed by the President of the United States. We realize that these suggestions were put forward in informal discussions and statements made at a time when the Western Powers were not yet sure that the Soviet Union was prepared to meet them halfway. Nevertheless, we cannot afford to ignore such suggestions when they concern negotiations so important as those in progress on the cessation of nuclear tests.

My delegation would also like to make a few brief observations on another argument put forward by the Western delegations to dispute that national means of detection and identification are perfectly adequate to ensure compliance with

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an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. In an attempt to refute modern scientific facts, the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, referred (ENDC/PV.103, p.28) to a statement made by Mr. Dean in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 26 October 1962:

"Although it is a well-publicized fact that stations in other countries have recorded certain -- and I repeat, certain -- of our underground nuclear explosions, there have been many other explosions which have not been identified as nuclear explosions and, in fact, have not even been detected -- simply not detected -- by scientific stations and observatories outside the United States. And this is true despite the fact that we have made public announcements of the occurrence of underground explosions at the Nevada tests site and in several cases have given the precise time of the explosions. But despite this fact some of these explosions have not been detected by stations outside the United States.

"Let me repeat again what I just said. The United States has conducted many underground nuclear explosions which were not even detected -- let alone identified." (A/C.1/PV.1255, p.26)

I have repeated this quotation of Mr. Godber's in full because it is significant at this particular stage in our discussions. We maintain, we continue to maintain, that the applied science of today is capable of ensuring the detection and identification of all underground tests, as has been shown by practical experience.

However, supposing we assume for the moment that the United States representative's assertions correspond to the reality. On this assumption, let us examine the substance of Mr. Dean's argument. If we read this passage with care, we find a statement to the effect that the stations installed in the United States recorded and identified all the explosions made in that country. This proves that the means and information which would be at the international scientific commission's disposal immediately a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests came into force would be perfectly adequate to detect and identify all underground explosions. That is what Mr. Dean asserts.

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We must not forget, moreover, as our Czechoslovak colleague pointed out today and as our Polish colleague also pointed out a few days ago, that as soon as a treaty was concluded all the information of the national stations would be at the disposal of the scientific commission responsible for supervising the implementation of the agreement to cease tests. This would include information from stations situated on the territory of countries in which certain suspicious or doubtful events might have occurred.

We are therefore forced to conclude that, even if we accept what Mr. Dean asserted in the First Committee of the General Assembly, the international scientific commission would always be able to ensure the application of an agreement to cease nuclear tests. But we should add that we certainly do not accept Mr. Dean's assertions.

It is therefore perfectly clear that an agreement to cease nuclear tests could be concluded if only the Western Powers sincerely wished it. Their reluctance is discouraging and does not augur well for the future work of our Conference. The United States and their Western nuclear partners do not seem resolved to take the political decision required to facilitate our Conference's work and to conclude an agreement to cease nuclear tests. They appear to be in a state of mind similar to that described by Senator Hubert Humphrey in his speech of 3 October 1960, on the eve of the United States presidential election:

(continued in English)

"... throughout the Conference" -- he was referring to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests -- "the United States has been plagued with ambivalence of purpose. ... We have seemed to vacillate between the objective of wanting to conclude an agreement as soon as possible, and the belief that constant progress in the negotiations is to our disadvantage."

(continued in French)

Although Senator Humphrey, who attended our Conference some days ago, was addressing his criticisms to the Republican administration, it would be impossible to find a more apt description of the present position of the United States delegation, which seems to us still to consider that progress in the negotiations for a test ban treaty would be to its disadvantage.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

That is a really extraordinary and incomprehensible state of affairs after the concessions made by the Soviet Union fully satisfying the former demands of the Western nuclear Powers. The United States continues to make ever new demands and to raise ever new questions, the discussion of which would not only prolong these negotiations but would also jeopardize the chances of reaching agreement on a nuclear test ban.

I should also like to point out that we shall not reach any agreement to cease nuclear tests by discussing details and technical questions. On the contrary, such discussion would be likely to lead us further away from an agreement. What is needed for an agreement on this important question is a political decision by the Western nuclear Powers, which alone can enable us to conclude an agreement to cease nuclear tests.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I have three more speakers on my list but, in view of his imminent departure, the representative of Italy would like an opportunity to reply to the statement just made. If the representatives of Canada, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union agree, I shall call on the representative of Italy now.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I hope I shall be forgiven if I delay this morning's debate for a moment. I certainly do not wish to become involved now in a long discussion with the representative of Bulgaria, but I want to reply to him immediately in order to avoid any confusion in our debate and in order that there may be no misunderstanding of the Italian delegation's position in regard to other delegations. Consequently I am asking to speak on a point of order rather than to exercise my right of reply.

I wish to point out to Mr. Tarabanov that our discussions will not be furthered by efforts to attribute to other delegations ideas which are the contrary of those which those delegations have expressed and which are reproduced in the verbatim record. This is an old method which the socialist delegations employ from time to time, but it is not a constructive one. The sense of my statement was and still is perfectly clear, at any rate to all delegations except the Bulgarian. We have reached a deadlock here, above all because the socialist delegations are imposing a sort of veto on the discussion of questions concerning

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the number of inspections and black boxes. They are opposing the general discussion of the necessary guarantees which would render a treaty acceptable. These questions are important, and their solution would be of great assistance to us in solving in their turn the other questions which constitute the principal problems.

I think that the statement made today by the United States representative was very clear. He reaffirmed that certain problems were linked and must be studied together in order to have a complete panorama of the guarantees which a treaty can give us. The method of work adopted by the socialist delegations, the sort of veto which they are exercising, are inexplicable and totally incompatible with the desire of the great majority of delegations present here to see rapid progress in our work.

As I have said, the aim of my statement was clear. I wished to rescue the Conference from the deadlock, a temporary one I hope, in which it has now become involved. This aim is clearly apparent in my statement, and especially in the following passage:

"My only desire is for a solid and practical foundation to be laid, so that serious discussion of all matters that can and must be discussed here can take place without delay.

"It is for this reason that I have suggested that the Conference might care to follow the list of questions which I have just read out, and to subject each question to a thorough examination in order to draw up an agreed text on each." (ENDC/PV.103, p.8)

I think my intention was quite clear, and I regret that the Bulgarian delegation did not choose to understand it.

Mr. BURNS(Canada): The Canadian delegation has, of course, listened carefully to the statements which have been made this morning, and we feel it necessary to say at this time that there are two points concerning the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests which it is essential that all members of this Conference should recognize. The first is that the conclusion of a test ban treaty is of the utmost importance to the whole endeavour of this Conference. We know that failure to agree on a test ban would in all likelihood mean the degeneration of our work into a sterile debate; that in turn would result in a final loss of confidence in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by all

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the nations which have placed their hopes on our achieving disarmament. The second point is that the differences between the two sides over the substance of a treaty have already been reduced to such an extent that there is no technical barrier which cannot be removed, given a mutual willingness to compromise on matters of detail.

I believe that the work of this Conference has reached a crucial stage and that, in deciding on the procedure for our continued work, we must ensure that the maximum effort is effectively directed to solving the test ban problem. All members of this Conference agree that the test ban issue is our first responsibility. That was repeated in the speech we have just heard from the representative of Bulgaria. On Wednesday and again today the representative of the United States made a number of suggestions for the organization of our future work which the Canadian delegation has been considering. We agree that we should not lose sight of the other tasks which are before us: that is, to come to an accord on certain collateral measures and -- our ultimate aim -- to build an agreement on general and complete disarmament. We believe, however, that it would be inappropriate to commence detailed discussion of these other matters until we are satisfied that concrete negotiations on the test ban are under way and are being conducted in a manner which promises early success.

What ways are now open to us for conducting the test ban negotiations? As many speakers before me have emphasized, the most satisfactory way would be by direct negotiations between the nuclear Powers, with regular progress reports to the plenary meetings. However, to our regret, and despite the urgent appeals of most members here, those direct negotiations have not yet been undertaken. In the circumstances we are faced with a difficult choice. We could turn to the discussion of other questions in the hope that the nuclear Powers will soon enter into direct negotiations. Another course, which the Canadian delegation believes is the correct one, would be to make a final concerted effort to see that those negotiations get under way in plenary meetings. Although that may not be the ideal forum for the purpose, the Canadian delegation believes that until the nuclear Powers themselves undertake substantive negotiations, in sub-committee meetings or otherwise, we all have a responsibility to exploit the possibilities offered by discussion in plenary meetings.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

At our meeting on Wednesday last, 27 February, the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, formulated a detailed list of questions (ENDC/PV.103, pp. 6,7), which require thorough examination; he explained his meaning further in his statement today. His list was divided under four main headings. He suggested that the Conference might draw up an agreed text on each of the items he enumerated; and what I have to say now arises out of the ideas he put forward at that time.

On behalf of the delegation of Canada I wish to propose that the Conference draw up a definite agenda for discussion of the test ban treaty. In so doing we should be following the precedent already established for our discussion of general and complete disarmament when we adopted the agenda in document ENDC/52. It is our view that by establishing, in the same way, an agenda for the discussion of the nuclear test ban we could overcome the difficulty which has arisen over whether the numbers question should be solved independently of agreement on other aspects of the system, or whether an understanding on the major elements in the system must exist before the question of numbers can be solved. We would hope that to adopt a specific agenda would permit the parallel discussion -- and I emphasize the words "parallel discussion" -- of all the essential elements of a test ban agreement, which is the way that a number of representatives have already suggested to get us out of this dilemma.

We would therefore ask that the co-Chairmen agree to recommend such an agenda to this Conference. In so doing they could take into account suggestions which various members have made, including those which have been put forward by the representative of Italy. If I may say so, the Italian list of subjects is drawn up in a very logical and orderly way. However, perhaps other members of the Conference may wish to submit their own ideas on an agenda. They might do so in writing to the co-Chairmen, following the practice which we adopted when we were discussing other topics in earlier sessions.

The Canadian list of items, which I shall now give, is shorter and more general; and we have selected them according, as we see it, to the consensus of other delegations' views on the subjects on which discussion and agreement are most essential. They are as follows:

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- (1) the organization of the verification system, under which specific details concerning the network of national stations and the instrumentation and number of automatic stations would be examined;
- (2) the criteria for judging a located seismic event as unidentified;
- (3) the method of choosing, within the quota, the event to be inspected, and other questions relating to the inspection process, such as the composition of inspection teams and the conditions under which inspection would be conducted;
- (4) the annual quota of on-site inspections;
- (5) the establishment and functions of the international scientific commission.

We would propose that, once agreement has been reached on an agenda, the representatives of the nuclear Powers, in accordance with suggestions which have already been made in the Conference, should submit draft treaty texts covering all or some of the items listed. Alternatively, as the items came up for discussion, the nuclear Powers could submit working papers which would serve to guide the Committee's discussions and clarify their respective positions. The delegation of Canada does not suggest that the order in which it has listed its items should necessarily be the order in which they would be taken up in the Conference. Another point: if it could be agreed, a definite time-limit could be imposed on the discussion of individual items. Finally -- and again in accordance with the practice established already in the context of our debate on general and complete disarmament -- any item on the agenda, after preliminary discussion in the Conference, could be referred to the co-Chairmen or to the representatives of the nuclear Powers for further examination and negotiation, on which the plenary Conference could expect a report in due course. We think that it would be sensible, of course, to start first with those matters on which the prospects of early agreement are greatest.

I have made this proposal since I am convinced that an anxious world is expecting this Conference to demonstrate its determination to resolve the differences -- the differences which still prevent the conclusion of a test ban treaty. What happens if we do not get that test ban treaty? It is very clear that nuclear testing will

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be resumed in all environments, and not only by the existing nuclear Powers but by others who wish to become nuclear Powers. That will lead to the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. We shall have lost a great opportunity; the opportunity that we should have seized by the forelock will have passed us by. We shall have lost our chance of checking the nuclear arms race.

The delegation of Canada cannot believe that the great nuclear Powers are more afraid of coming to an agreement with each other than they are of the prospect of nuclear war. Can the great Powers really maintain that three or four on-site inspections more, or three or four less, really constitute a risk to their security which is to be compared with the risk of the unchecked race in nuclear armaments and the race towards nuclear war?

Therefore I believe that we have a duty to make final and conclusive efforts towards a solution of this problem, and that we can do it by setting a definite agenda for our discussion and by getting to work with fixed methods and a firm purpose, thus taking a positive step towards the agreement we all wish for. It is in this spirit that I commend this proposal to the consideration of all my colleagues.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I think we must all have been impressed by the deep sincerity of the closing words of the speech which we have just heard from our Canadian colleague. I am sure that we all endorse that feeling, and I earnestly hope that we shall be able to put his proposal into effect. He put forward one or two thoughts on procedure to which I should like to revert. I intend to be very brief this morning in view of the hour and of the fact that I understand our Soviet colleague also wishes to speak. There are, however, just one or two points I want to make.

First, I observed in the opening speech this morning by our Czechoslovakian colleague that he did me the honour of quoting me; he also quoted the United States spokesman, from the records of the General Assembly last autumn. As I understand it, he adduced those quotations in support of the Soviet contention that the West had clearly indicated that the mere reacceptance of the principle of on-site inspection by the Soviet Union would be sufficient to ensure agreement. My colleagues will have noticed that there were no figures given in either of the quotations made. Of course on many occasions we did urge the Soviet Union to

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

revert to the acceptance in principle of on-site inspection; and of course we have referred to "few" on-site checks in numbers; but if anybody could impute that seven was a large number, or even that eight to ten was a large number, that would seem to me strange indeed. I think, therefore, that that is an argument which does not bear very close inspection; nor does it help us forward in our negotiations.

I was glad when the Chairman himself made his detailed and specific reference to the private conversations which took place in New York last autumn and which, it has been claimed, have formed the basis of a misunderstanding. It will be noted that the dates that the representative of the United States gave us were in any case subsequent to the dates of the quotations given by our Czechoslovakian colleague, so that to that extent the United States statement has far more substance; but the fact also that it happened during the course of private conversation and detailed consideration adds, I think, particular importance to the discussion which took place. I am grateful to the representative of the United States for having given us those details in so specific a form.

I would only add that my own experience was that it was the practice of Mr. Dean on the occasions of those private talks always to report to the United Kingdom delegation after the meeting, because the United Kingdom was the third party in matters dealing with nuclear weapon tests. He always did us the courtesy of informing us of the substance of those discussions. I recall the two occasions well; I have not had the opportunity of referring to my diary for the actual dates, but I have no reason to believe that they were not those to which the Chairman has referred. I recall the particular importance that Mr. Dean attached to the fact that Mr. Timerbaev had in fact approached Mr. Akalovsky again after the second meeting in order to reaffirm the actual numbers that had been stated. Mr. Dean told me about that at the same time as he informed me of the numbers he had mentioned -- which were exactly the ones the Chairman has given --, and in conversation with me he did draw from that the conclusion that, quite obviously, the Soviet delegation was interested in those figures, or it would not have asked for confirmation of them.

Therefore I confirm from my own recollection what the Chairman, in his capacity as representative of the United States, told us this morning and I hope we shall not have further charges with regard to what was said on those occasions. It may well be that there has been a misunderstanding; but at least let us realize what were the actual facts. I am grateful to Mr. Foster for bringing them to our attention.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

In the light of the Chairman's statement I was a little surprised that our Bulgarian colleague, speaking immediately afterwards, went back again to the same charges -- referred, indeed, to the quotation given by Mr. Kurka and tried to build upon that flimsy material. I really do not think that that is helping us towards agreement. The positions of the two sides are now abundantly clear, and I cannot see that mere reiteration of those charges is going to help us forward at all in our work. The position of the West is, as it has always been, based upon our best scientific assessment of the numbers of remaining unidentifiable seismic events. The position of the Soviet Union, of course, was based in the same way prior to November 1961: that certainly was our understanding. On that basis, at that time, in discussions prior to November 1961, the Soviet Union was arguing that, in spite of the existence of the considerable number of unidentified events, a very small quota was sufficient. The Western Powers argued for a larger quota, but we were arguing on an agreed scientific basis. At the moment we lack that agreed basis, and although the Soviet Union has agreed once more to the restitution of some on-site inspection, it has not agreed the scientific basis for this. That of course adds to the difficulties. I welcome the fact that it has reaccepted the principle of on-site inspection. Had it reaccepted the fact that there is a residue of unidentifiable seismic events I think that also would have been helpful.

However, all I would say to the Soviet Union is that the Western position has been continuously ascertained on the same basis throughout, and if the Soviet Union chooses to have a different basis, that is for it to decide; but it should not therefore seek to press the Western Powers to accept figures which we think are wholly unrealistic in relation to the provision of an effective test-ban treaty.

I do not wish to say any more about that at the present time, because I believe we are over-concentrating on the question of figures. Therefore I think it was probably very helpful, first, that at our last meeting our Italian colleague should have given us a list of some of the points at issue; and subsequently, this morning, that our Canadian colleague should have given us further thoughts on how we should proceed.

So far as the United Kingdom delegation is concerned, it is willing to fall in with any proposal which will help us to reach agreement on the various outstanding points. We are willing to discuss those matters in any way that is found most convenient. However, at the present time we are faced -- and we have to admit it frankly -- with the fact that the Soviet Union seeks to veto discussion of any matters other than the question of numbers. It seeks to over-dramatize that aspect.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I think that the Chairman, in his capacity as representative of the United States, has made it clear in some of his recent interventions that in that field numbers connected with one particular matter can be very much affected by agreement on other matters. It is a composite arrangement, and it must be a composite arrangement if it is to fulfil the scientific criteria which we in the West believe are necessary.

Therefore I think it would be helpful eventually to agreement on the numbers in relation to those two particular outstanding matters if we were first to establish agreement on all the other various matters, or on a wide range of them. It is very unfortunate that our Soviet colleagues, having moved in some degree, should still be unwilling to press forward with purposeful negotiations, and with the elaboration of treaty language and agreement on what we ought to be able to agree upon, which is a very large percentage of the matters outstanding. If we do not do that, what is the position going to be? The position is going to be that we might -- indeed we all fervently hope we shall -- reach agreement on those numbers at a subsequent meeting. When we have done that, we have still to thrash out the other various details. Misunderstandings have occurred before, and it is quite possible that further misunderstandings might arise over the interpretation that each side puts on particular matters. For one reason or another, that might hold up the conclusion of an agreement even after figures had been established in the context in which each side was viewing them. But if we reach agreement on the other matters first, we can then eliminate that risk -- and it is a risk which we should face.

Therefore I urge our Soviet colleagues to join us in discussing and in settling the various other matters which are outstanding -- in particular, as an example, the question of the automatic seismic stations. Has anyone around this table defined what one of these automatic stations will be like; what its size will be its capacity, the type of seismometers it will contain, the type of recording apparatus which will go into it? There has to be agreement on all that. There has to be agreement on how frequently the automatic seismic stations will be visited, whether in fact -- and there was a clear difference of opinion upon this at our last meeting -- they should be used solely as a monitoring device for national systems, or whether they should in addition provide information for identification as well. These are matters to which we ought to be giving our attention.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

We all want to make progress on this problem, but this mere concentration on reiteration of established positions, and this concentration on "the numbers game" in isolation from other facts, may not be the best way of achieving agreement. All that I am concerned with is that we should achieve speedy agreement; and I therefore hope that our co-Chairmen will look at the proposals which have been put forward both by the Italian delegation and by the Canadian delegation, and will see whether we cannot secure effective discussion which will not be a rehashing of old arguments but will seek to aid us towards complete agreement.

I said that I would be brief, and I think that is all I would wish to contribute to our discussion at this morning's meeting.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): During the debate on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, all the delegations represented in our Committee have touched upon the main basic aspects of this problem. All the speakers, including the Western representatives, noted with great satisfaction that the Soviet Union, having agreed to the inspection quota named and to the number of automatic seismic stations, had made a great political concession and had gone a long way towards meeting the position of the Western Powers. It was noted that the Soviet Union, having put forward such proposals, had in fact given the Western Powers what they had been asking for recently. The sincere advocates of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests had every reason to believe that the way would be open for agreement on this question. How great was first the astonishment, then the disappointment, and finally the concern of these people when the negotiations at this apparently most favourable moment suddenly reached an impasse and the prospect of an agreement vanished!

Such is the paradoxical result, such are the paradoxical practical consequences of this huge political concession which the Soviet Union has made to the United States on the question of inspection. The response of the United States to this act of goodwill on the part of the Soviet Government was a demand for an increased number of inspections and an increased number of automatic seismic stations. It has now become clear to everyone that everything depends upon the position of the United States. As soon as it ceases to insist upon its demand for further concessions on the part of the Soviet Union, the way to agreement will be open again. In this situation any proposal aimed at leaving the question of the inspection quota and the number of automatic seismic stations unresolved and at passing on to the consideration of secondary technical questions would not help matters and could only worsen the situation by giving rise to new differences.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In the technical and other questions dealt with at our last meeting by Mr. Cavalletti and today by Mr. Foster and Mr. Godber there is nothing fundamentally new. None of the magnitudes and measures touched upon in these multitudinous questions is self-sufficing or independent. They are derivative measures and magnitudes: that is to say, they depend to some extent upon the basic questions -- the quota of inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations. The form, the scope, the parameters and the character of these magnitudes and measures of a technical, organizational, administrative and financial character will depend largely upon the way in which these basic questions are solved. We must not put the cart before the horse if we wish to move forward; nor can we put the horse beside the cart, because such a combination will not move the cart. It is obvious that we must first of all solve the main problems, and that this will open the way to the solution of all the derivative questions.

We must realize clearly and take into account that any attempt to pass on to the consideration of secondary questions, whether of a technical, organizational or administrative and financial character, without preliminary agreement on the basic questions -- that is, the inspection quota and the number of automatic seismic stations -- will only bring about new deadlocks and new differences. That way will lead to the creation of an even more confused, difficult and complicated situation. We are now witnessing an obvious manoeuvre by the Western Powers. They wish to drag the Committee into a quagmire of technical discussions so as to avoid an agreement and to camouflage the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom are responsible for the new deadlock in the negotiations which has come about through their refusal to reach agreement on the conditions which they themselves had previously proposed.

Today, for the first time after a long period, we have heard cries about a veto. This is very symptomatic. Whenever in the course of our negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests we have been getting close to an agreement -- as in the present case, for instance -- the Western Powers, anxious to avoid an agreement, have covered up ~~their~~ retreat with cries about a Soviet veto. Today we have again heard these wails from Mr. Godber and from the representative of Italy, and this is very symptomatic. It is quite clear to us that the Western Powers are set on running away from an agreement. If that is the policy of the Western Powers, then say so and do

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

not try to drag the Committee into a quagmire of technical discussions which in the absence of agreement on the basic questions would only create new deadlocks, new differences, new difficulties and new obstacles in the way to agreement. We do not wish to take part in that.

You consider that we must solve all the technical questions enumerated in Mr. Cavalletti's list (ENDC/PV.103, p.6). He listed twenty-three questions, divided them into four groups, and warned that still other questions and other problems would have to be added to this list. Mr. Foster, in his turn, said that these questions would have to be even more detailed, and so forth. And today Mr. Godber said that we should also have to discuss how the automatic seismic stations should be organized, how they should be equipped, where they should be located, and what their functions should be; although it had already been agreed that the function of automatic seismic stations was to verify the reliable operation of national detection and identification systems, and nothing else.

If we weigh all this up, reflect carefully and consider where it would lead us, we shall see that if we were to take the path proposed by the Western Powers -- that is, to start a discussion on administrative and technical details without prior agreement on the main questions -- we should certainly need not only days but many weeks and months, perhaps even years, of technical discussions. That is where the proposals of the Western Powers, aimed at avoiding the solution of the main questions and at plunging into a quagmire of technical discussions, would lead us. We have already had experience of such discussions with the Western Powers, and I can state on the basis of that experience that in the absence of agreement on the main questions such discussions would result in creating new deadlocks, new difficulties and new obstacles to agreement. Therefore proposals which would result in deflecting the work of our Committee to the discussion of technical, organizational, administrative, financial and such-like details are not the path which we must take if we really wish to speed up the negotiations and achieve an agreement.

The only path that will lead to an agreement is to agree on the compromise conditions which are now before us. These conditions are not the result of one-sided, arbitrary demands; they were drawn up with due regard to what the Western Powers had proposed. Moreover, the proposals of the Western Powers were accepted in their entirety. And whatever Mr. Foster may say here or whatever Mr. Godber may say in tune

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

with him, a fact remains a fact: you proposed these figures to us. We conducted bona fide negotiations with you; we had, so to speak, "fair negotiations" with you; but unfortunately, just when agreement was near and its breath could already be felt in the air, when agreement was, as they say in English, "just round the corner", the United States made an abrupt about-turn and began presenting new demands and putting new conditions before us.

That line in our negotiations must be abandoned, and then the way to agreement will be open. We shall continue to work in that direction, and we should like to hope that Mr. Foster's departure will play a positive role -- not of course in the sense that he will not be here personally, but in the sense that in Washington he will be able to put matters right. We shall hope that Mr. Foster's trip to Washington will result in giving us the impulse we so much need for a positive solution of the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests which has been dragging on for so long.

Today a number of representatives have expressed their views, and I should like to note the very constructive, thoughtful and well-reasoned statements of the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian representatives. We consider that the Western Powers should listen to these arguments and draw the appropriate conclusions.

Now I should like to answer the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns. Any attempt to divert our Conference into a maze of technical discussions, Mr. Burns, will lead to no good. We have already had a wealth of experience in this field, and your manoeuvre -- not yours personally, Mr. Burns, but the manoeuvre of the Western Powers -- is perfectly clear to us. At present we are not concerned with technical details, about which you speak; we are concerned with the need to solve the main questions. There is the main question of two to three inspections, which we have proposed; these figures are yours; three automatic seismic stations -- these figures are scientifically well-founded; they are sufficient for verifying the functioning of national systems. We have a good basis. No one in the world will understand -- I understand Mr. Burns' exclamation -- if agreement upon this important question is frustrated on account of a difference of two or three inspection or two or three automatic stations.

We shall study carefully in the record the statements of all the representatives, and we reserve the right to revert, at later meetings if necessary, to the questions they have touched upon.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): If no other representative wishes to speak, I will read a statement which grew out of a meeting of the co-Chairmen yesterday and a discussion by them on procedure:

"The co-Chairmen have agreed to recommend to the Conference that the meetings next week be devoted to the nuclear test ban question. The co-Chairmen recommend that Monday's plenary meeting be an informal meeting, the meetings on Wednesday and Friday to be regular plenary sessions." If there are no objections, that procedure will be followed next week.
It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and fourth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. William C. Foster, representative of the United States of America.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the United States, Bulgaria, Italy, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference, which will be informal, will be held on Monday, 4 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m. The next official meeting will be held on Wednesday, 6 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.